The relationship is studied between possibility and necessity measures defined on arbitrary spaces, the theory of imprecise probabilities, and elementary random set theory. It is shown how special random sets can be used to generate normal possibility and necessity measures, as well as their natural extensions. This leads to interesting alternative formulas for the calculation of these natural extensions.
I. Introduction P OSSIBILITY measures were introduced by Zadeh [1] in 1978. In his view, these supremum preserving set functions are a mathematical representation of the information conveyed by typical affirmative statements in natural language. For recent discussions of this interpretation within the behavioural framework of the theory of imprecise probabilities, we refer to [2] , [3] , [4] .
Supremum preserving set functions can also be found in the literature under a number of different guises. For instance, they appear in Shackle's logic of surprise [5] , and were studied in a measure-theoretic context by Shilkret [6] . They also play the part of special limiting cases in Shafer's theory of belief functions [7] . In a number of recent papers [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , we have studied in detail how possibility measures fit formally into the behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities [12] . Also relevant is the related work by Dubois and Prade [13] , [14] , and by Walley [3] .
Here we discuss the relationship between possibility measures in the context of imprecise probabilities on the one hand, and random sets on the other hand.
We begin with a short overview of the relevant basic definitions. We work with a non-empty set Ω, called the universe of discourse. A possibility measure Π on (Ω, ℘(Ω)) is a mapping from the power class ℘(Ω) of Ω to the real unit interval [0, 1] , which is supremum preserving in the following sense: for any family (A j | j ∈ J) of subsets of Ω, Π( For more details about the theory of possibility measures, we refer to [1] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] .
As mentioned above, possibility and necessity measures can be incorporated into the behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities. Let us briefly describe how this is done. We limit ourselves here to definitions and results which are relevant in the context of this paper. For a detailed account of the theory of imprecise probabilities, we refer to the book by Walley [12] .
The universe of discourse Ω can be interpreted as a possibility space, that is, the set of the mutually exclusive possible outcomes of a specific experiment. A gamble X on Ω is a bounded real-valued function on Ω, and can be interpreted as an uncertain reward. The set of all gambles on Ω is denoted by L(Ω). An event A in Ω is a subset of Ω. The set of all events in Ω has already been given the notation ℘(Ω). We identify events with their characteristic functions, and interpret them as 0 − 1-valued gambles. We also denote a constant gamble on Ω by the unique real value it assumes. The pointwise order on
An upper prevision P is a real-valued function on a set of gambles K ⊆ L(Ω). In order to identify its domain and possibility space, it is often denoted as (Ω, K, P ). The corresponding, or conjugate, lower prevision (Ω, −K, P ) is defined on the domain −K = {−X : X ∈ K} as P (X) = −P (−X), X ∈ −K. In the behavioural context, P (X) can be interpreted as an infimum price for selling the gamble X, and P (X) as a supremum price for buying it. If K is in particular a class of events, then P is called an upper probability. The corresponding lower probability P is then defined on the set {coA : A ∈ K} by P (A) = 1 − P (coA).
The set L(Ω) is a linear space when provided with the pointwise addition of gambles and the pointwise scalar multiplication of gambles with real numbers. A linear functional P on L(Ω) which is positive (X ≥ 0 ⇒ P (X) ≥ 0) and has unit norm (P (1) = 1) is called a linear prevision on L(Ω). A linear prevision is a prevision, or fair price, in the sense of de Finetti [21] . Its restriction to ℘(Ω) is called a (finitely) additive probability on ℘(Ω). Note that P (−X) = −P (X), X ∈ L(Ω), which means that as an upper prevision, P is equal to the corresponding lower prevision, i.e., P is self-conjugate. The set of linear previsions on L(Ω) is denoted by P(Ω). If K is a subset of L(Ω), a functional on K is called a linear prevision on K if it is the restriction to K of some linear prevision on L(Ω). A similar definition is given for additive probabilities on arbitrary classes of events.
Given an upper prevision (Ω, K, P ), we define its set of dominated linear previsions M(P ) as
We say that (Ω, K, P ) avoids sure loss if M(P ) = ∅, and is coherent if it avoids sure loss and
It is the greatest coherent upper prevision that is dominated by P on its domain K. (Ω, K, P ) is clearly coherent if and only if it coincides on its domain K with its natural extension. The natural extension (Ω, L(Ω), E) of the corresponding lower prevision (Ω, −K, P ) is defined by
Equivalent alternative definitions of avoiding sure loss, coherence and natural extension, with a direct behavioural interpretation, can be found in [12] .
It has been shown elsewhere [3] , [8] , [9] that for a possibility measure Π on (Ω, ℘(Ω)) the following statements are equivalent: (Ω, ℘(Ω), Π) avoids sure loss; (Ω, ℘(Ω), Π) is a coherent upper probability; and Π is normal. It will therefore from now on be assumed that Π is normal. Its dual necessity measure is then the corresponding coherent lower probability. It can be verified 1 that their natural extensions to L(Ω), respectively denoted by Π and N, are given by the following Riemann-Stieltjes integrals 2 : (1) and
In these expressions, F X and F X are respectively the lower and upper distribution functions of the gamble X with respect to the pair Π and N, defined by, for any y ∈ R:
1 The main point is that normal possibility measures are 2-alternating and normal necessity measures 2-monotone; the statement then follows from a result by Walley [12, Section 3.2.4] . 2 In the first expressions, the integration domains can be restricted
In what follows, we show that any possibility measure and any necessity measure can be constructed using a probability measure and a nested multivalued mapping. In particular, we thereby retrieve and at the same time refine a result proven by Dubois and Prade [13] for the special case that Ω = R. The line of reasoning we follow here draws from the ideas that lie at the basis of the theory of evidence [7] , [22] and elementary random set theory [23] .
At the same time, and more importantly, we show that this construction allows us to extend possibility and necessity measures in a straightforward way to upper and lower previsions which will turn out to be precisely their natural extensions, discussed above. In this way, we arrive at alternative formulas for the calculation of the natural extensions of possibility and necessity measures.
II. Multivalued mappings, gambles and events
Consider the real unit interval [0, 1] and a mapping Ψ from [0, 1] to ℘(Ω), also called a multivalued mapping from [0, 1] to Ω. We assume that Ψ is antitone in the following sense:
which implies that Ψ([0, 1]) is a nested collection of sets, or in other words, a chain of sets. We want every element of Ω to be contained in some Ψ(x), x ∈ [0, 1], which due to (C1) amounts to:
For reasons that will become clear at the end of Section III, we do not exclude the existence of x in [0, 1] for which Ψ(x) = ∅. In order to deal with this, we define the set
With any gamble X on Ω, we may associate two special gambles X * and X * on [0, 1], defined as follows:
where θ * and θ * are real numbers to be determined shortly, and the complement 'co' is relative to the unit in-
Since we want X * and X * to be gambles on [0, 1], i.e., bounded [0, 1] − R-mappings, we try and remedy this by introducing θ * and θ * , which we determine by imposing extra conditions on X * and X * . First of all, we want that (−X) * = −X * , which is obviously equivalent 4 to θ * + θ * = 0. Also, for any event A in Ω, we find in particular that
and similarly
We want A * and A * to correspond to events in [0, 1] . θ * and θ * may therefore only assume the values 0 and 1. θ * + θ * = 0 then implies that θ * = θ * = 0, whence, with obvious notations,
where the complement 'co' on the left hand sides is relative to Ω, and on the right hand sides relative to the real unit interval [0, 1]. In particular, ∅ * = ∅ * = ∅ and Ω * = Ω * = coE Ψ . The interpretation of these notions is rather straightforward. As we shall see further on, the multivalued mapping Ψ can be interpreted as a way to transmit information from [0, 1] to Ω. For a gamble X on Ω, X * is the smallest gamble on [0, 1] compatible with X, and X * the greatest. That X * (x) = X * (x) = 0 if Ψ(x) = ∅ assures that the gambles X * and X * are (behaviourally) neutral in those elements of [0, 1] that do not connect to elements of Ω.
We now investigate the Borel measurability of the events A * and A * , and the gambles X * and X * . For any event A in Ω, A * is a down-set and A * ∪ E Ψ an up-set of the chain ([0, 1], ≤). Since we assumed that Ψ(0) = Ω, it must also be that A * = ∅ ⇔ A = ∅, and A * = coE Ψ ⇔ A = Ω. Note that A * = ∅ implies (coA) * = coE Ψ , and that A * = ∅ implies A * = coE Ψ . Consider the following elements of [0, 1] for any A ⊆ Ω:
Note that both η * (A) ≤ ε Ψ and η * (A) ≤ ε Ψ . We find that
To prove (3), remark that if x < η * (A), the characterisation of supremum on a chain tells us that there exists a y in A * for which x < y and therefore x ∈ A * . A similar proof may be given for the second statement. Since we have seen above that In order to investigate the Borel measurability of the gambles X * and X * , we must for instance check whether, for every y in R, the sets 
where of course {X ≥ y} = {ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) ≥ y} and {X ≤ y} = {ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) ≤ y}. 
III. Random sets, possibility and necessity measures
After these preliminary considerations, we are ready to proceed to the main topic of this paper. Consider a proba- 
and the integral in this expression is the Lebesgue integral with respect to the measure P o [12] . Note that the bounded mapping Y is always integrable on the compact set [0, 1]. We shall assume that the measure P o is absolutely continuous 5 with respect to the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. Why this assumption is necessary, will become apparent in the proof of Lemma 3.
The introduction of the probability measure P o on the measurable space ([0, 1], B([0, 1]) ) allows us to formally interpret the multivalued mapping Ψ as a random variable, whose values are subsets of Ω. Ψ is therefore also called a random set [23] , or a random subset of Ω.
We want to use the linear prevision E Po to construct a pair of coherent upper and lower previsions on L(Ω), and consequently also a pair of coherent upper and lower probabilities on ℘(Ω). We shall assume that
5 There seems to be no such requirement in the more restrictive context of [13] , but we fail to see how it can be omitted even there (see also the proof of Lemma 3).
In other words, we exclude that the random set Ψ would be almost surely (P o ) empty, which would mean that P o ({x ∈ [0, 1] : Ψ(x) = ∅}) = 1. Proposition 1 then enables us to define an upper prevision (Ω, L(Ω), Π Ψ ) as follows. For any X in L(Ω):
Since we have made sure that X * = −(−X) * , and since E Po is a linear prevision on the linear space of the Borel measurable gambles on [0, 1], we find for the corresponding
In what follows, we intend to study these upper and lower previsions in more detail. For a start, we find the following expressions for the corresponding upper and lower probability of the event
These are instances of the more general formulas proposed by Dempster in his paper on upper and lower probabilities induced by a multivalued mapping [22] . In particular, we find that Π Ψ (∅) = N Ψ (∅) = 0 and Π Ψ (Ω) = N Ψ (Ω) = 1. Let us now show that the upper probability (Ω, ℘(Ω), Π Ψ ) is a normal possibility measure, and that the lower probability (Ω, ℘(Ω), N Ψ ) is consequently a normal necessity measure. Consider any family (A j : j ∈ J) of subsets of Ω, then for any x in [0, 1]: 
. When we invoke Lemma 3, we find the following result.
Theorem 2: The restriction of Π Ψ to ℘(Ω) is a normal possibility measure and the restriction of N Ψ to ℘(Ω) a normal necessity measure on (Ω, ℘(Ω)). For their respective distributions π Ψ and ν Ψ we find, for any ω in Ω:
The upper probability (Ω, ℘(Ω), Π Ψ ) and the lower probability (Ω, ℘(Ω), N Ψ ) are therefore coherent.
Lemma 3: Consider a family (x j : j ∈ J) of elements of [0, 1] and an element x of [0, 1].
Proof: The proof of the first statement is immediate, since P o is by assumption absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. Let us therefore prove the second statement. Since P o is increasing, it need only be shown that
If sup j∈J x j belongs to the family (x j : j ∈ J), the proof is immediate. Let us therefore assume that x i < sup j∈J x j , i ∈ J, which implies that there exists a strictly increasing sequence (x * n ) n∈N in the family (x j : j ∈ J) which converges to sup j∈J x j . As a consequence, the strictly increasing sequence ([0, x * n ]) n∈N converges to n∈N [0, x * n ] = [0, sup j∈J x j [, and therefore, taking into account the wellknown limit properties of a measure:
This proves the second statement, also taking into account the first.
Dubois and Prade [13] have proven a similar result in the special case that the sets Ψ(x), x ∈ ]0, 1], are bounded and closed real intervals. In the case of a finite universe of discourse Ω, the essence of this result was already known to Shafer [7] .
Remark 1: If we were to start out with a coherent upper probability P o , defined on a suitably large collection of subsets of [0, 1], rather than with the probability measure P o , we would for instance still be able to define an upper probability P Ψ on the universe of discourse Ω through the formula
It is clear from the previous discussion that P Ψ will be maxitive in the sense that P Ψ (A ∪ B) = max{P Ψ (A), P Ψ (B)}. Whether P Ψ will be a possibility measure, depends on the continuity properties of the upper probability P o . As an example, we have just shown that if P o is a probability measure, its absolute continuity with respect to Lebesgue measure is sufficient to guarantee that Π Ψ = P Ψ is not only maxitive but also a possibility measure. If Ω is finite, the coherence of P o is sufficient for P Ψ to be a possibility measure.
In what follows, we shall call the couple (P o , Ψ) a random set representation of the possibility measure Π Ψ and the necessity measure N Ψ on (Ω, ℘(Ω)).
We now proceed to show that every normal possibility and necessity measure on (Ω, ℘(Ω)) can be obtained in this way, i.e., have a random set representation! Indeed, given any normal possibility measure Π on (Ω, ℘(Ω)), define the multivalued mapping Ψ as follows: for any x in [0, 1], Ψ(x) = {π ≥ x} = {ω ∈ Ω : π(ω) ≥ x}, where π is the distribution of Π. This Ψ clearly satisfies conditions (C1) and (C2). Furthermore, for any ω in Ω, {ω}
Finally, since Π is normal, sup ω∈Ω π(ω) = 1, whence E Ψ = ∅ or E Ψ = {1}, according to whether the supremum 1 of π is reached or not. In any case, P o (coE Ψ ) = 1 and (C3) is satisfied. This proves our assertion. The couple (λ, {π ≥ ·}) will be called the standard random set representation of the possibility measure Π and its dual necessity measure N (see also [25] , [26] ).
We want to stress that for this choice of Ψ, E Ψ is not necessarily empty! In the case E Ψ = {1}, π does not reach its supremum in any of the points of its domain. The distribution of Π is then called non-modal . It therefore turns out that we had to allow E Ψ = ∅ in order to be able to incorporate into the random set model normal possibility measures with non-modal distributions.
IV. Random sets and natural extension
Let us now use this information to derive a formula for the calculation of Π Ψ (X) and 
where F Y (x) = P o ({Y ≤ x}). Since for any gamble X on Ω, the corresponding gamble X * on [0, 1] is Borel measurable, this allows us to rewrite Eq. (7) as
where for any x in R, F X * (x) = P o ({X * ≤ x}). Now, taking into account (4) and (C3), we find for any y in R,
If we substitute (10) into (9), we find, taking into account well-known results from the theory of Riemann-Stieltjes integration [27] :
and consequently also
where F X is the upper distribution function of X associated with the pair Π Ψ and N Ψ . In other words, using the probability measure P o and the nested multivalued mapping Ψ, we are able to construct in a natural way not only possibility and necessity measures, but also their natural extensions! As a corollary, we find that the upper and lower previsions (Ω,
The right-hand sides of (11) and (12) are precisely the expressions Dempster has suggested for calculating what he calls the upper and lower expectation of X associated with the upper and lower probabilities Π Ψ and N Ψ [22] .
Remark 2: The argument relating the natural extension of Π Ψ in a gamble X to the expectation E Po (X * ) does not depend on the properties of Ψ, nor on the fact that Ψ is defined on [0, 1]. In particular, this means that this connection is more generally valid for completely alternating upper probabilities (or plausibility functions) rather than just for possibility measures. It also remains valid if we replace the probability measure P o by a 2-alternating upper probability: the crucial point is the induced upper probability is then also 2-alternating, and that natural extension for 2-alternating upper probabilities can be calculated using a Choquet integral.
This result, together with the argument presented at the end of the previous section, also allows us to give an alternative expression for the natural extensions of a possibility measure Π and its dual necessity measure N on (Ω, ℘(Ω)). Let π be the distribution of Π. For the standard random set representation (P o , Ψ) = (λ, {π ≥ ·}) of Π and N, we know that P o (coE Ψ ) = 1, whence, if we also denote by Π the natural extension of Π, Π(X) = [0,1] X * dλ, where in
is discontinuous in at most a countable number of elements of [0, 1], and therefore the Lebesgue integral is equal to the corresponding Riemann integral [28] :
The second equality holds because the two integrands may only differ in their points of discontinuity, which are at most countable in number. Similarly, if we also denote by N the natural extension of N: (14) or in terms of the distribution ν of N:
When we compare these expressions with (1) and (2), the symmetry (exchangeability) between π and ν on the one hand, and X on the other hand, is striking. Formulas (13) and (14) have been found independently by Peter Walley and were published recently in [3] . The proof he has found is different from the one given here, and does not rely on the link between possibility measures and random sets, which has a central part in this paper. It was first published in [29] . An even more direct proof of (13), based on a suggestion by Hugo Janssen, runs as follows. It is obvious that Π(X) as given by (1) is the Choquet integral of X with respect to the set function Π, which according to an important result by Denneberg [30] It is obvious that the equality holds for t = 1. We therefore concentrate on t ∈ [0, 1[. Clearly, 
V. Conclusion
We have shown that any possibility and necessity measure can be constructed using a probability measure and a multivalued mapping (a random set). At the same time, and more importantly, we have proven that their natural extensions can be obtained in a similar way. This course of reasoning has provided us with alternative formulas for the calculation of these natural extensions.
